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The Antecedents of Block Share Purchases 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the determinants of block purchases of shares between 1981 and 1989 in 
Fortune 500 firms that suiVived the period. We find that poor accounting performance increased 
the likelihood of block purchase. consistent with theory suggesting that block purchases are 
intended to disciplirie managers. We also find that neither diversification nor defensive measures 
such as dual-class stock, shark repellents, and ESOPs had any statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of block purchase. In contrast, firm size and insider ownership were inversely related to 
the likelihood of block purchase. 
The demise of the hostile takeover market in the late 1980s has heightened interest in 
alternative mechanisms of corporate control, particularly in the role played by activist 
shareholders. A well-functioning market for corporate control reliant on shareholder activism calls 
for large shareholders to target under-performing fmns without being deterred by corporate 
defenses. Consistent with the view that large shareholders can effectively play this role, existing 
studies show that block share purchases are followed by increases in share value, change in 
management and redirection of corporate policies.l However, the determinantS of blockholder 
activity remain poorly understood. Specifically, are the firms most in need of redirection targeted 
by large shareholders? 
This study documents the determinants of block purchases by outside investors by addressing 
the following questions. First, do outside blockholders predominantly target poorly performing 
firms? Second, are diversified firms more likely to be targeted by outside blockholders than more 
focused firms? Mounting evidence indicates that an important goal of restructuring in the 1980s 
was to reverse inefficient diversification among large fmns.2 Blockholders may have played an 
important role in catalyzing corporate refocusing. Finally, are block purchses deterred by 
defensive mechanisms such as dual-class stock structures, ESOPs, shark repellents, and 
incorporation in a state with anti-takeover statutes? Defensive mechanisms may dilute incentives 
to buy large blocks of stock by reducing outside shareholder voting power. Defenses should have 
little effect on the incidence of blockholder activity in a well-functioning market for corporate 
control. 
Our main fmdings, based on an analysis of the determinants of block purchases in a sample 
of 264 F onune 500 fmns that survived the 1980s, are fourfold: 
(i) Block share purchases by outsiders are most likely to occur when target fmns have low 
accounting performance. This supports previous theory and evidence that blockholders 
discipline managers of under-performing firms. 
(ii) A company's diversification policy does not affect the likelihood of a large block purchase by 
outside investors. This suggests that diversified firms do not provide more attractive 
arbitrage opportunities for buyers of blocks of stock than do more focused firms. 
(iii) Incorporation in a state with anti-takeover laws and adoption of defensive measures such as 
dual-class stock structures, shark repellents, and ESOPs do not reduce the likelihood of an 
investor purchasing a block of stock in a firm. This corroborates previous evidence that 
defensive mechanisms have little effect on the likelihood of takeover. 
(iv) Block purchases are less likely to occur in firms with high insider ownership and in large 
firms. These fmdings are consistent with previous evidence that firms with these 
characteristics experience fewer takeovers. 
Overall, these fmdings show that block purchases are often motivated by poor target finn 
performance and that defensive mechanisms are ineffective in deterring large block share 
purchases. This suggests that the market for corporate control functions effectively to remedy the 
agency costs of separation of ownership and control in large corporations. 
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the relationship 
between block purchases, defensive mechanisms, and the market for corporate control. Section ll 
describes the sample selection procedure and data used in the study. The empirical evidence on 
the antecedents of block purchases is presented in Section m. Section IV summarizes our fmdings 
and concludes. 
I. Blockholders and the Market for Partial Corporate Control 
A. Block Purchases, Managerial Discipline, and Target Firm Performance 
It is widely recognized that the interests of managers of publicly held corporations may 
diverge from those of stockholders. However, the degree to which managers can pursue their own 
interests at shareholders' expense may be moderated by the market for corporate control. 
Specifically, managers who do not act in shareholder interests can be replaced through takeover 
(Manne ( 1965) ), or disciplined by large shareholders (i.e., blockholders ). Blockholders have 
incentives to monitor and control managers because they internalize the benefits of these actions 
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through their purchases (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Blockholders can use their voting power to 
promote efficient corporate policies; if managers resist changing corporate policy, blockholders 
can threaten to put the finn into play (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Empirical evidence shows that 
blockholders increase finn value by disciplining managers and effecting changes in corporate 
policy. Holderness and Sheehan (1985), for example, find that block purchases increase share 
value and precede changes in top management. Mikkelson and Ruback (1991) show that 
increases in share value following block purchases are subsequently dissipated if top management 
is not replaced, or if major changes in corporate policy do not take place. It is not known, 
however, whether blockholders systematically target poorly performing firms. 
B. Diversification and Block Purchases 
Diversification has been widely acknowledged as a source of poor finn performance during 
the ·1980s. Empirical evidence provided by Lang and Stulz (1992) shows that focused firms had 
consistently higher Tobin's q's than did more diversified fmns during the 1980s. Likewise, 
Comment and Jarrell (1993) show that refocusing during the 1980s increased fmn value. 
There are two principle explanations for the poor performance of diversified fmns. First, 
diversification may result from inefficient expansion undertaken by managers seeking to 
maximize their private benefits rather than the value of the finn (Marris ( 1964 ), Jensen ( 1988) ). 
In particular, Amihud and Lev (1981) and Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) argue that 
managers who are not large shareholders have incentives to diversify into unrelated lines of 
business to reduce bankruptcy risk and hence, protect the value of their human capital. Second, 
diversified firms may have become less efficient over time compared to more focused firms. 
These reason for this is that internal capital markets, on which diversified fmns have historically 
relied, have become less efficient relative to external capital markets. Increased liquidity and a 
lower cost of raising funds externally may have caused more focused fmns to perform better than 
diversified firms (Bhide ( 1990) ). 
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H diversification reduces finn value, then shareholders can be expected to buy blocks of stock 
and refocus operations. This study investigates whether diversified fmns are more likely than 
focused fmns to become targets of block purchases. Diversified firms may also be more attractive 
restructuring opportunities than focused firms because correcting overdiversiflcation may be 
easier than improving performance in unprofitable, but focused firms. In the former case, 
shareholders purchase stock and divest under-performing lines of business. In the latter case, 
however, restructuring typically entails complex strategies that call for detailed knowledge of 
operations on the part of blockholders. 
C. Defensive Mechanisms and Block Purchases 
Faced with hostile activist investors, self-interested managers may seek to protect their jobs 
and associated private consumption streams by adopting "defensive" mechanisms -- such as dual-
class stock structures, shark repellents, and ESOPs -- that significantly increase the cost of 
takeovers and partial changes in corporate control. Managers may also re-incorporate a finn in a 
state with anti-takeover statutes. These mechanisms dilute incentives in the market for partial 
corporate control because they increase takeover costs. One way that blockholders exert their 
influence is to threaten to put a firm into play if managers are unwilling to improve corporate 
policy (DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). In addition, defensive 
mechanisms such as dual-class stock structures and super-majority provisions diminish 
blockholders' voting power, preventing them from using proxy contests and otherwise exercising 
their voting power to pressure managers to change corporate policy. 
C.J Dual-Class Stock Structures 
In dual-class stock structures, only a minority of shares are accorded full voting rights; 
shareholders at large have less than full voting power to effect change in corporate policy. 3 
Consequently, if voting stock is concentrated in the hands of managers and other insiders, they can 
use their voting power to protect their private consumption streams against shareholder activism 
and takeover (Ruback ( 1988) ). Consistent with the argument that dual-class stock structures raise 
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the costs of disciplining managers, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) fmd that announcements of dual-
class recapitalizations, especially for fmns with high insider stock ownership, are accompanied by 
statistically significant negative price effects.4 
C.2 Shark Repellents 
Shark repellents include super-majority provisions, classified board provisions, fair price and 
redemption rights provisions, poison pills, and preferred stock authorizations. These provisions 
increase the costs of influencing fmn policy because they force blockholders to incur the cost of 
legal challenges to restrictions on block ownership or force blockholders to incur the cost of 
gaining management's approval to block purchases. Consistent with the argument that shark 
repellents are detrimental to shareholders' interests, Jarrell and Poulsen ( 1987) fmd negative stock 
price reactions to announcements of anti-takeover charter amendments. s Ryngaert ( 1988) and 
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) fmd negative stock price reactions to poison pill announcements.6 
Despite this evidence, the effectiveness of shark repellents in actually deterring takeovers is 
unclear. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) fmd that anti-takeover charter amendments and poison 
pills do not reduce the likelihood of takeover, although preferred stock authorizations appear to 
reduce takeover frequency. Comment and Schwert (1993) also fmd that poison pills have no 
effect on the likelihood of takeover.7 
C.3 Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
During the 1980s, many fmns adopted ESOPs, most of which diluted the voting power of 
outsider investors by transferring the control of blocks of shares from outsiders to trustees elected 
by insiders. Although ESOPs may also serve other purposes, such as providing performance 
incentives to employees and tax benefits to firms, critics of ESOPs contend that they entrench 
incumbent management and are detrimental to shareholder interests. Consistent with this 
argument, Gordon and Pound ( 1990) find that ESOPs established in the presence of takeover 
activity and those that transferred control from outside shareholders reduced firm value. 8 
Similarly, Chang and Mayers (1993) find that ESOPs established by fmns in which managers 
held a high proportion of shares reduced fmn value. 
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C.4 Second-Generation State Anti-Takeover Statutes 
Second-generation state anti-takeover statutes restrict the voting rights of large shareholders 
or delay mergers for periods of three to five years for companies in their jurisdiction. 9 Critics of 
state anti-takeover statutes argue that they diminish the voting rights of large outside shareholders 
and diminish blockholders' ability to make credible takeover threats to management. Supporting 
the argument that anti-takeover statutes reduce shareholders' power to discipline managers, 
Karpoff and Malatesta ( 1989) and Szewczyk and Tsetsekos ( 1992) fmd negative average returns 
in firms affected by state anti-takeover statutes.IO 
D. Other Dete"ents to Block Purchases 
D.l Insider Ownership 
Insider share ownership can provide incentives for managers and other corporate decision-
makers to act in the interests of shareholders at large (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). However, 
Stulz (1988) cautions that insider ownership can also increase insiders' discretion for self-
interested behavior, because managers who own a large proportion of shares can use their voting 
power to resist takeovers and shareholder activism. Consistent with this argument, Morek, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) fmd that the relationship between 
insider share ownership and Tobin's q is non-monotonic, showing first an increase, consistent with 
incentive effects, and then a decline, consistent with entrenchment. Dann and DeAngelo ( 1988) 
and Denis ( 1990) fmd that changes in corporate fmancial structure that increase insiders' voting 
power reduce finn value. These fmdings are consistent with the argument that insiders use their 
voting power to protect their private interests. 
D.2 Firm Size 
Target finn size is another factor that may deter block purchases by activist investors. 
Purchasers of blocks of shares may be limited by individual or corporate wealth constraints, and 
so, may be less able to buy blocks of stock in large firms (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Consistent 
with this theory, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) fmd that large firms are less likely to receive 
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takeover bids than smaller firms; Similarly, Comment and Schwert (1993) fmd that large firms 
are less likely to be taken over. 
II. Sample Selection and Data 
A. Sample 
We test our hypotheses with an exhaustive sample of 264 Fonune 500 firms in 1981 that 
remained publicly traded through 1989. We excluded firms that merged or were acquired 
between 1981 and 1989, as well as foreign firms, subsidiary companies, and firms that declared 
bankruptcy. This sainple allows us to examine changes in corporate control in the largest 
surviving publicly held fmns in the U.S. economy. By examining surviving firms we attempt to 
distinguish between "toehold" block purchases made prior to takeover and disciplinary block 
purchases in which blockholders seek to discipline managers without resorting to takeover 
(Shleifer and Vishny ( 1986)). The sample contains a survivorship bias, because it includes only 
firms that remained on the market through 1989. This bias, however, lessens our chances of 
finding a relationship between poor performance and block purchases, given that many poorly 
performing fmns were taken over during the 1980s and thus, are excluded from our sample. 
Likewise, a survivorship bias favors us fmding that defensive mechanisms deter block purchases, 
because ceteris paribus, fmns that survived the 1980s without being acquired are likely to have 
had more effective defensive mechanisms than fmns that did not survive. 
B. Definition of Shareholder Groups 
We follow McConnell and Servaes (1990) in defming two primary groups of shareholders: 
blockholders and insider owners. McConnell and Servaes's ( 1990) classification of shareholder 
groups follows the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing procedures, which define a 
blockholder as any corporation or individual who owns a beneficial interest of 5 percent or more 
of a fmn's outstanding shares. Insiders are defmed as officers and directors of a fmn and their 
families. 
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In Section I, we argued that owners of large blocks of stock are likely to increase finn value. 
However,not all blockholders as defined by the SEC can be expected to exert a disciplinary effect 
on managers. In particular, some existing blockholders such as founders, founding families, and 
family trusts can be expected to reflect insider interests. Family trusts, for example, have 
incentives to ensure continued employment in the firm for family members and adequate 
dividends to support beneficiaries' private consumption.ll Therefore, when measuring insider 
ownership, we classify the ownership interests of insider blockholders with those of other insider 
owners as defined by the SEC. 
C. Data Sources 
Data on insider and outsider ownership structure were collected from Value Line and 
confirmed using the Wall Street Journal and 13D filings. Data on diversification were collected 
from TRINET Inc.'s Large Establishment Database, which was released in 1981, 1983, 1985, 
1987, and 1989. Data on the presence of anti-takeover charter amendments, dual-class share 
structures, states of incorporation, and ESOPs were collected from Moody's Industrial Manual. 
We used information supplied by Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) to identify states that adopted 
second-generation anti-takeover laws. Financial information was obtained from COMPUST AT. 
D. Methods 
We tested the hypotheses using pooled time-series cross-sectional logistic regressions. Data 
for each firm were collected for five two-year time periods consonant with the availability of 
TRINET data on diversification. These periods are 1980-81, 1982-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, and 
1988-89. Details of the logit analyses of the determinants of block purchases are discussed in the 
following section. 
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III. Empirical Results 
A. Sample Characteristics 
Table I describes the fmns in the sample during the 1980-89 period. The frequency of block 
purchases is measured using a dummy variable that equals one if an outsider bought at least 5 
percent of a finn's outstanding common stock during a two-year period (and zero otherwise). 
Block purchases took place in approximately 6 percent of the fmns in the sample in the 1982-83 
and 1984-85 periods, and in 5.3 percent offmns in the 1986-87 period. In the 1988-89 period, 
block purchases took place in 10.2 percent of sample fmns. 
Table I also shows the average profit margin and return on assets (ROA) measured at the 
outset of each two-year period and the dividend-adjusted stock return for the two-year period.t2 
Both profit margin and ROA declined slightly in the early 1980s and then increased. Stock returns 
fluctuated more, with an average 19 percent drop in 1985-87 and a gain of 57.4 percent between 
1988 and 1989. These changes reflect the collapse of stock prices in 1987 and their subsequent 
recovery. 
Diversification is measured using a Herfindahl concentration ratio of employees for all four-
digit lines of business of a fmn for the years 1981. 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989. This ratio 
(reported as a percentage) is lower for more diversified fmns and higher for more focused fmns. 
Table I shows that sample firms became slightly more diversified between 1981 and 1989, with 
the Herfmdahl ratio falling from 28 percent in 1981 to 26.3 percent in 1989. 
The dual-class dummy variable equals one if a finn had a dual-clac;s stock structure at the 
outset of any two-year period (zero otherwise). In 1981,4.5 percent of sample fmns had dual-
class stock. This percentage rose throughout most of the period analyzed; by 1989, 7.6 percent of 
sample firms had dual-class stock. The shark repellent dummy equals one if a fmn had a 
shareholders' rights plan (zero otherwise). In our sample, 31.4 percent offmns had some type of 
shark repellent in 1981; by 1989, all firms had some type of shark repellent in their charter. The 
ESOP dummy equals one if a fmn had an ESOP in place (zero otherwise). The data show an 
increase in ESOP adoption. In 1981, 3.4 percent of sample fmns had an ESOP; by 1989, 9.5 
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percent of ftrms had adopted an ESOP. The state anti-takeover law dummy equals one if a frrm is 
incorporated in a state with an anti-takeover law (zero otherwise). By 1989 most states had 
passed some type of anti-takeover legislation and nearly all frrms in the sample were incorporated 
in one of these states. Only nine finns in the sample changed states of incorporation during the 
period. Of those nine firms, six changed from . a state with no amendment to a state with anti-
takeover legislation. 
Average insider ownership, which includes the holdings of officers and directors, their 
family members, founders, founding families, and founding family trusts, declined slightly over 
-the period. In 1981 insiders held an average of 9.1 percent of outstanding shares, whereas in 1989 
they held 6.9 percent. We define an insider holding dummy that equals one if insiders held 5 
percent or more of a finn's outstanding shares in any period (zero otherwise).l3 This dummy 
measures insider holdings large enough to motivate managers to maximize share value. The mean 
value of this dummy variable declined from about 4.6 percent in 1980-81 to about 4.1 percent in 
1988-89. A dummy was also defmed for large ftrms that equals one if a frrm's sales were above 
the sample median, measured for all periods (zero otherwise). The data show that frrms in the 
sample increased in size between 1981 and 1989; by 1989,58.3 percent of the frrms in the sample 
had constant dollar sales above the sample median. 
B. Univariate Comparisons 
Table ll compares the characteristics of ftrms that experienced block purchac;es during 
1981-89 with frrms that did not. The table shows the medians of descriptive variables and the 
corresponding p-values from Wilcoxon tests of differences in distribution. 
First, Table ll shows statistically significant differences in median profitability, measured at 
the outset of each two-year period, between frrms in which block purchases took place and other 
firms. Firms in which block purchases took place had a median profit margin of3.4 percent, 
compared with a median profit margin of 5 percent in ftrms in which no block purchases took 
place. This represents an absolute difference in performance of 1.6 percent between the two 
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groups of firms; the performance of firms that did not experience block purchases was 14 7 
percent greater than the performance of firms that did. Similar results are found for ROA and 
stock return. The median ROA in firms experiencing block purchases was 4.4 percent, compared 
with a median ROA of 6.5 percent in firms with no block purchases -- an absolute difference in 
performance of 2.1 percent and a percentage difference of 148 percent. The median two-year 
dividend-adjusted stock returns were lower in firms experiencing block purchases; in these firms, 
median returns were 2.2 percent, compared with 4.9 percent in other fmns. These fmdings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that outsider investors purchase blocks of stock with the intention 
of disciplining managers to improve finn performance. 
There is no statistically significant difference in the median Herfmdahl ratio of corporate 
focus between the two groups of fmns. This suggests that blockholders of stock were indifferent 
to firms' diversification policies at the time that they invested. It also indicates that diversification 
policy was not an underlying cause of the differences in fmn performance observed between fmns 
experiencing block purchases and other fums. 
With regard to defensive mechanisms, we find no statistically significant difference in the 
mean proportion of fmns with dual-class stock structures between the two groups of fmns. 
However, firms that experienced block purchases had a statistically significant higher mean 
incidence of shark repellents and ESOP adoptions and were more likely to be incorporated in a 
state with an anti-takeover amendment than were fmns that did not experience a block purchase. 
Coupled with accounting performance that is lower in fmns that experienced block purchases, this 
finding is consistent with the argument that managers of under-performing firms institute 
defensive mechanisms, as found by Comment and Schwert ( 1993 ). 
Finally, median insider ownership, measured as a percentage of insider holdings to 
outstanding shares, does not differ between the groups. The mean insider ownership dummy for 
finns that experienced a block purchase, however, was significantly lower than that for other 
finns. Firms in which block purchases took place were also smaller, an indication that large firm 
size may deter such purchases. 
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C. Determinants of Block Purchases 
Table m shows the results of the logit regressions predicting block purchases using measures 
of corporate performance, diversification, defensive measures, insider holdings, and firm size.14 
The most important result is that block purchases are more likely to take place in firms with poor 
accounting performance, which is consistent with the findings of the univariate analyses presented 
in Table n. Model 1 shows that fmns with lower profit margins at the outset of any two-year 
period were about six times more likely to experience a block purchase during that period than 
other fmns (coeffic~ent = -8.52, p-value < 5 percent).IS Model 2 is a lagged model that examines 
the effects of profits at the outset of the previous two-year period and changes in profits during the 
previous two-year period on the likelihood of a block purchase. The results of this regression also 
show that firms with low prior profitability and subsequent declines in profitability were more 
likely to experience block purchases. 
Similar results are shown in Models 3 and 4, which measure profitability in terms of ROA. 
Model 3 shows that firms with low ROA at the outset of a two-year period were about three times 
more likely to be the target of a block purchase than other firms (coefficient= -4.42, p-value < 1 
percent). Similarly, Model 4 shows that ROA at the outset of the prior two-year period, and 
change in ROA in the prior period, are also statistically significant and strongly negatively related 
to block purchases. 
Overall, this evidence consistently shows that outside blockholders buy into firms with poor 
accounting performance. These results are obtained despite the presence of a survivorship bias 
that should overstate the average profitability of surviving fmns during the 1980s. Moreover, 
because we analyze only surviving fmns, the evidence indicates that blockholders frequently buy 
into under-performing fmns without subsequently pursuing a takeover. This result is consistent 
with previous theory and evidence that blockholders play an important role in disciplining 
managers in under-performing fmns (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holderness and Sheehan 
(1985), Mikkelson and Ruback (1991)). 
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ModelS shows no statistically significant relationship between firms' two-year dividend-
adjusted stock returns and the likelihood of block purchase. This fmding is inconsistent with the 
evidence presented in Table II, that stock returns were significantly lower in fmns experiencing 
block purchases. 
None of the regression models indicate that diversification influences the likelihood of block 
purchase. This finding is consistent with the univariate analyses, which show that there is little 
difference in corporate focus between firms experiencing block purchases and other firms. 
Together, these results strongly support the conclusion that diversification policy did not motivate 
block purchases during the 1980s. This evidence appears to contradict the conclusions of several 
prior studies that diversification reduces finn value. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1993) 
find that refocusing increases fmn value, whereas Lang and Stulz (1992) find a substantial 
discount in the market value of diversified fmns during the 1980s. The results of the univariate 
analysis show that our fmdings are not due to a correlation between diversification and poor 
performance. 
The regressions also provide no evidence that defensive mechanisms deter block purchases. 
None of the variables measuring dual-class stock, shark repellents, ESOPs or state anti-takeover 
laws are statistically significant in any of the regressions. Again, this result is obtained despite a 
survivorship bias that favors the survival of fmns with effective defensive mechanisms. Our 
findings are inconsistent with the results of the univariate analyses presented in Table II, which 
indicate a strong correlation between block purchases and the adoption of defensive measures. 
They are consistent, however, with Comment and Schwert's (1993) fmdings that defensive 
measures are predicted by poor firm perfonnance. One explanation is that the correlation shown 
in Table II loses its significance once we control for peifonnance. 
All five models show that insider ownership and large firm size deter block purchases. The 
coefficient of the insider dummy is about -0.50 in all five regressions, indicating that blockholders 
are two-thirds as likely to buy into firms with high insider share ownership. This evidence 
suggests that entrenched insiders may deter changes in partial corporate control, as well as 
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complete changes in corporate control, as suggested by Dann and DeAngelo (1988), Stulz (1988), 
and Denis (1990). The coefficient on the large firm dummy is about -0.70 in all five regressions, 
indicating that blockholders buy into large firms at less than half the rate that they do in other 
finns. Finn size appears to protect managers from the market for corporate control. This fmding is 
consistent with Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Comment and Schwert ( 1993 ), which show 
that takeovers are less frequent in large firms. 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
This study presents evidence that outside blockholders play an important role in disciplining 
managers of public fmns. We fmd that block purchases are more likely to take place in fmns with 
poor accounting performance and that defensive mea<;ures are ineffective in deterring block 
purchases. These fmdings have important implications for corporate governance in the 1990s. In 
recent years, the market for hostile takeovers and buyouts has largely subsided, leaving the task of 
monitoring and controlling managers in many large public firms to activist shareholders. 
Therefore, factors that deter block purchases threaten this new environment of corporate control. 
Our fmdings provide some reassurance on this count. They suggest that blockholders serve the 
interests of shareholders by targeting under-performing fmns, and that managers in such fmns 
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Endnotes 
1 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Mikkelson and Ruback ( 1991 ), Holderness and 
Sheehan (1985), and Barclay and Holderness (1991 ). 
2 See Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1993), and Lang and Stulz 
(1992). 
3 The voting rights of so-called nonvoting shares in dual-class stock structures vary. Usually, 
nonvoting shares have some voting rights, but they are considerably restricted relative to the rights 
ofvoting shares. 
4 Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find an average one-day announcement return of -0.82 percent for a 
sample of 88 dual class recapitalizations between 1976 and 1987. In contrast, Partch ( 1987) finds 
no significant stock price effects when dual-class stock structures are announced. 
5 Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) fmd an average announcement return of -1.25 percent for a sample of 
649 anti-takeover charter amendments during the period 1980-85. 
6 Ryngaert (1988) finds an average return of -0.34 percent for a sample of 283 poison pill 
announcements; Malatesta and Walkling (1988) fmd an average announcement return of -0.92 
percent for a sample of 132 poison pills. 
7 Comment and Schwert ( 1993) argue that poison pills are instituted by managers in anticipation 
of a takeover attempt. They fmd that the same factors that predict takeovers also predict the 
adoption of poison pills, and that poison pills are associated with increac;;es in takeover premiums. 
8 In a sample of 94 ESOPs formed between 1987 and 1989, Gordon and Pound (1990) fmd a 
two~ay negative share price reaction of approximately -4 percent to ESOPs formed in the 
presence of takeover activity and a negative ~hare price reaction of -4.6 percent to ESOPs that 
diluted the voting power of outside shareholders. 
9 Second-generation state anti-takeover Jaws were enacted after the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned "first-generation" anti-takeover legislation. Second-generation control share statutes in 
Indiana were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987; an appellate court upheld Wisconsin's 
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business combination statute in 1988. These laws usually include one or more of the following 
provisions: (i) control share provisions, which require that a target firm's shareholders preapprove 
acquisitions of voting rights above a certain level of ownership; (ii) fair price provisions, which 
regulate the back-end price in a two-tiered takeover bid involving large shareholders; and (iii) 
freeze-out laws, which prohibit a bidder from engaging in a business combination with a target 
firm for a specified period, unless so approved by the target firm's board (Karpoff and Malatesta 
(1989)). 
10 Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) document an average two-day return of -0.29 percent for firms 
affected by the passage of state anti-takeover statutes. Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) fmd 
average abnormal returns of -9.09 percent for fmns affected by Pennsylvania's anti-takeover 
statute during the period that the statute was being legislated. 
11 Chandler ( 1990), among others, argues that founders and founding families may be more 
concerned with maintaining control of a business and its associated private income streams than 
with maximizing the value of the fmn. Consistent with the conjecture that some blockholders 
represent the interests of insiders rather than shareholders at large, Slovin and Sushka ( 1993) fmd 
a two-day abnormal stock price reaction of 3.01 percent when the deaths of insider blockholders 
are announced. 
12 Profit margin is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales. ROA is 
measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to assets. 
13 In unreported analyses, we defined dummies for insider ownership ranging from 5 percent to 
50 percent to distinguish between levels of insider ownership that might motivate managers and 
those that might entrench managers, consistent with the fmdings of Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). We did not fmd any differences in our results using 
different definitions of insider ownership. 
19 
14 In unreported analyses, we spit our sample into two time periods: 1981-1985 and 1986-1989. 
We ran logit regressions identical to those described on the two samples. We did not fmd any 
significant differences in results between the two samples. 
15 Maddala ( 1983) shows that an equivalent ordinary least squares regression coefficient is 
approximately two-thirds the magnitude of a logit coefficient. 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics by Two-Year Period 
Sample means of measures of blockholder purchases, performance, diversification, and defensive measures. The 
sample consists of 264 Fortune 500 finns in 1981 that survived as independent public firms through 1989. Block 
purchase frequency equals one if a shareholder bought at least 5 percent of a firm's outstanding common stock 
during the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). Profit margin equals operating income/sales before 
depreciation. ROA equals operating income/assets before depreciation. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted two-
year stock return for each period indicated. The Herfindahl ratio is a measure of the focus of a firm's activities across 
business areas; it is the sum of the squared JI"Oponions of each four-digit line of business's share of total fum 
employees. The dual-class dummy equals one if a fum had dual-class stock at the outset of the two-year period 
indicated (zero otherwise). The shark repellent dummy equals one if a fum had an anti-takeover charter amendment, 
poison pill, or other type of shark repellent in place at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). 
The ESOP dummy equals one if a fum had an ESOP at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). 
The state anti-takeover statute dummy equals one if a fum was incorporated in a state with a second-generation 
takeover amendment at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The insider percent is the 
fraction of shares held by a flllll's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts at 
the outset of the two-year period indicated. The insider holding dummy equals one if a firm's officers, directors, 
founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts held 5 percent or more of a firm's stock at the outset of 
the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The large fum dummy variable equals one if a firm's sales were 
larger than the pooled sample median fum sales for all five periods (zero otherwise). 
Sample Means 1980~81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 1988-89 
Block purchase frequency 0% 6.1% 6.1% 5.3% 10.2% 
Profit margin 0.055 0.041 0.032 0.050 0.048 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.071 0.053 0.042 0.055 0.053 
Stock return -0.068 0.252 0.047 -0.190 0.574 
Herfmdahl ratio of focus 28.0% 27.2% 27.4% 26.3% 26.3% 
Dual-class dummy 4.5% 5.3% 6.1% 8.0% 7.6% 
Shark repellent dummy 31.4% 31.4% 34.5% 76.9% 100% 
ESOP dummy 3.4% 3.4% 4.2% 4.9% 9.5% 
State anti-takeover 
statute dummy 0.0% 12.1% 29.9% 40.9% 94.3% 
Insider ownership percent 9.1% 8.3% 7.7% 7.1% 6.9% 
Insider dummy 48.9% 50.0% 46.2% 42.8% 41.3% 
Large firm dummy 46.2% 47.3% 48.9% 54.9% 58.3% 
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Table II 
Comparison of Firms Experiencing Block Purchases to Other Firms 
Comparison of the median values of variables (mean values for dummy variables) for firms that did and did not 
experience block purchases between 1981 and 1989, and the corresponding Wilcoxon test statistics for differences in 
diSbibution. Block purchase frequency equals one if a shareholder bought at least 5 percent of a firm's outstanding 
common stock during the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). Profit margin equals operating income/sales 
before depreciation. ROA equals operating income/assets before depreciation. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted 
two-year stock return for each period indicated. The Herfindahl ratio is a measure of the focus of a firm's activities 
across business areas; it is the sum of the squared proportions of each four-digit line of business's share of total firm 
employees. The dual-class dummy equals one if a fiTill had dual-class stock at the outset of the two-year period 
indicated (zero otherwise). The shark repellent dummy equals one if a fiTill had an anti-takeover charter amendment, 
poison pill, or other type of shark repellent in place at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). 
The ESOP dummy equals one if a fiTill had an ESOP at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). 
The state anti-takeover statute dummy equals one if a fiTill was incorporated in a state with a second-generation 
takeover amendment ai the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The insider percent is the 
fraction of shares held by a firm's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts at 
the outset of the two-year period indicated. The insider holding dummy equals one if a firm's officers, directors, 
founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts held 5 percent or more of a firm's stock at the outset of 
the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The large fiTill dummy variable equals one if a firm's sales · were 
larger than the pooled sample median fiTill sales for all five periods (zero otherwise). 
No Block Wilcoxon 
Block Purchase test 
Variable Purchase statistic (p-value) 
Profit margin 0.034 0.050 0.0001 
Return onassets (ROA) 0.044 0.065 0.0001 
Stock return 0.022 0.049 0.0400 
Herfmdahl ratio of focus 0.247 0.218 0.2900 
Dual-class dummy 0.041 0.064 0.4308 
Shark repellent dummy 0.685 0.541 0.0161 
ESOP dummy 0.096 0.040 0.0200 
State anti-takeover statute dummy 0.562 0.342 0.0001 
Insider ownership percent 0.020 0.020 0.9089 
Insider dummy 0.301 0.468 0.0056 
Large fmn dummy 0.343 0.503 0.0075 
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Table III 
Logit Analysis of Blockholder Entry into Fortune 500 
Firms that Remained Independent Between 1981 and 1989 
The dependent variable equals one if a shareholder bought at least 5 percent of the ftnn's outstanding common stock 
in any two-year period sampled (zero otherwise). Block purchase frequency equals one if a shareholder bought at 
least 5 percent of a ftnn's outstanding common stock during the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). Profit 
margin equals operating income/sales before depreciation. ROA equals operating income/assets before depreciation. 
StOck return is the dividend-adjusted two-year stock return for each period indicated. The Herfindahl ratio is a 
measure of the focus of a fiTill's activities across business areas; it is the sum of the squared proportions of each four-
digit line of business's share of total firm employees. The dual-class dummy equals one if a fum had dual-class stock 
at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The shark repelJent dummy equals one if a fum had 
an anti-takeover chaner amendment, poison pill, or other type of shark repelJent in place at the outset of the two-year 
period indicated (zero otherwise). The ESOP dummy equals one if a fum had an ESOP at the outset of the two-year 
period indicated (zero otherwise). The state anti-takeover statute dummy equals one if a fum was incorporated in a 
state with a second-generation takeover amendment at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). 
The insider percent is the fraction of shares held by a firm's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, 
or founding family ousts at the outset of the two-year period indicated. The insider holding dummy equals one if a 
fum's officers, directors, founders, founding family members, or founding family trusts held 5 percent or more of a 
fum's stock at the outset of the two-year period indicated (zero otherwise). The large firm dummy variable equals one 
if a fiTill's sales were larger than the pooled sample median firm sales for all five period~ (zero otherwise). 
Results are displayed on the following page. 
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Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 ModelS 
Intercept 3.69 2.10 -2.11 2.05 -2.31 
(2.34) (1.18) (44.6)••• (40.7)••• (56.6)••• 
Profit margin at the -8.52 
begirming of the (5.96)•• 
b1ockholder entry period 
Profit margin 2 years prior -6.21 
to blockholder entry period (5.32)•• 
Olange in p-ofit margin in the -2.16 
2 years Jrior to blockholder entry (6.70)** 
ROA at the beginning of the -4.42 
blockholder entry period (7.67)••• 
ROA 2 years prior to the -5.54 
blockholder entry period (9.04)••• 
Change in ROA during the 2 year -3.83 
period prior to blockholder entry (5.55)** 
Stock market return for 2 years -0.21 
prior to blockholder entry (1.35) 
Hetfmdahl ratio of focus 0.49 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.40 
(0.54) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
Dual-class dummy -0.46 -0.48 -0.45 -0.42 -0.57 
(0.53) (0.57) (0.52) (0.46) (0.82) 
Shark repellent dummy 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.27 
(1.19) (1.11) (1.34) (1.06) (1.17) 
ESOP dummy 0.19 0.21 0.16 0 .13 0.26 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.18) 
State anti-takeover statute dummy 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.092 0.11 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) 
Insider dummy -0.51 -0.50 -0.51 -0.48 -0.54 
(3.67)* (354)* (3.77)* (3.26)* (4.33)•• 
Large frrm dummy -0.70 -0.72 -0.73 -0.72 -0.80 
(6.65)••• (7.11)••• (7.37)••• (7.06)••• (8.84)••• 
Log-likelihood -252.6 -255.3 -254.1 -253.5 -257.6 
Model p-value 0.001 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.052 
( ) indicates chi-square test of whether a coefficient is different from zero. The asterisks indicate: 
• statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. 
•• statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
••• statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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